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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)0).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is the administrative rule promulgated by the Board of Oil Gas &

Mining ("BOGM") in conformity with the plain language and intent of the authorizing
statute's exemption for sand, gravel, and rock aggregate, or does it attempt to inappropriately
expand the Division of Oil Gas & Mining's ("DOGM") jurisdiction in enforcing, interpreting
and defining the scope of the authorizing statute?
Standard of review: Correction of error. In determining whether a
district court correctly applied the governing law, an appellate court will give no deference
to the district court's legal conclusions, but will review them for correctness. S.W. Energy
Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co.. 1999 UT 23, % 11, 974 P.2d 1239.
2.

Was the administrative rule promulgated by BOGM supported by

substantial evidence?
Standard of review: De novo review of record. Since the lower court
limited its review to the administrative record as prepared by DOGM, the appellate court is
just as capable of reviewing the administrative record as is the lower court, and the appellate
court gives no deference to the lower court's review of the record. The appellate court looks
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at the petition as if it were brought to the appellate court directly. Tolman v. Salt Lake
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 1991).
3.

Did the lower court err in holding that the correct standard of review for

reviewing the administrative rule promulgated by BOGM was the "tolerable limits of reason"
standard?
Standard of review: Correction of error. In determining whether a
district court correctly applied the governing law, an appellate court will give no deference
to the district court's legal conclusions, but will review them for correctness. S.W. Energy
Corp. at Tj 11.
4.

Was the lower court limited to the administrative record created by

DOGM and, in particular, should AGCU's request for discovery have been allowed?
Standard of review: Correction of error. In determining whether a
district court correctly applied the governing law, an appellate court will give no deference
to the lower court's legal conclusions, but will review them for correctness.

S.W. Energy

Corp. at IT 11.
All the foregoing issues were raised and addressed in the memoranda submitted to the
trial court relative to the parties' respective motions for Summary Judgment. See Record at
563-640.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND RULES
The specific statute at issue is the Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 40-8-1 et seq. ("the Act"). The administrative rule at issue is Utah Admin. Code
R647-1-106 (the "Rule"). Copies of both are attached as part of the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
Plaintiff/Appellant Associated General Contractors, Utah Chapter ("AGCU") brought
this action to challenge the promulgation of an amendment to the Rule.
Course of Proceedings.
Once the Rule was promulgated by BOGM, a lawsuit challenging the Rule was
brought in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County. Once the suit was filed and BOGM
filed what it claimed was the administrative record on the matter, AGCU attempted to take
discovery, which was resisted by BOGM, and ultimately a protective order prohibiting any
discovery was issued by the lower court. Thereafter, the matter moved to final disposition
based on the administrative record submitted by BOGM.
Disposition in the Trial Court.
The two sides presented motions for summary judgment. The lower court ruled in
favor of BOGM, holding that the Rule had been promulgated pursuant to evidence and
testimony proffered by BOGM during hearings. In its ruling, the lower court did not address
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the specific language in the Act nor how the language in the Rule was in conformity with the
clear language of the Act.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In 1975, the Utah Legislature enacted the Act to ensure that mining operations

are conducted and operated "in such a way as to minimize undesirable effects on the
surroundings." Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-2.
2.

DOGM was designated as the administrative body that would oversee the

regulation of the Act, and BOGM was designated as the Act's rulemaking and enforcement
body. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-6.
3.

From 1975 until 1986, DOGM did not consider the sand and gravel industry

to be governed by the Act. See Record at 413, 609-10.
4.

In late 1986, DOGM sent letters to several sand and gravel operations

indicating that they were subject to the reclamation requirements of the Act because,
according to DOGM, any extraction of consolidated materials was necessarily a mining
operation. Id.
5.

The sand and gravel industry responded in the very next session of the Utah

Legislature by initiating an amendment to the Act which specifically excluded "sand, gravel,
and rock aggregate" from the definitions in the Act of "deposit," "mineral deposit," and
"mining operation." See Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-4(3) and (8).
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6.

This exemption ("the Exemption") was somewhat addressed in Larson

Limestone Co. v. State Division of Oil Gas & Mining, 903 P.2d 429 (Utah 1995). However,
this Court chose not to rule specifically on the Exemption at that time.
7.

On or about May 5, 1998, over ten years after the Legislature passed the

Exemption, BOGM promulgated the Rule, as an amendment to Utah Admin. Code R647-1106, wherein BOGM defined sand, gravel, and rock aggregate for purposes of the Act as
follows:
"Sand" means a naturally occurring unconsolidated to moderately consolidated
accumulation of rock and mineral particles, the dominant size range being
between 1/16mm to 2mm, which has been deposited by sedimentary processes.
"Gravel" means a naturally occurring unconsolidated to moderately
consolidated accumulation of rock and mineral particles, the dominant size
range being between 2mm and 10mm, which has been deposited by
sedimentary processes.
"Rock Aggregate" means those consolidated rock materials associated with a
sand deposit, a gravel deposit, or a sand and gravel deposit, that were created
by alluvial sedimentary processes. The definition of rock aggregate
specifically excludes any solid rock in the form of bedrock which is exposed
at the surface of the earth or overlain by unconsolidated material.
8.

BOGM held hearings with regard to its proposed Rule on two different

occasions. However, on neither of these occasions did BOGM identify to the members of
the public in attendance exactly all of the material that BOGM was considering in relation
to promulgating its proposed Rule.
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9.

The first time that AGCU was aware of certain material supposedly part of the

administrative record was after the litigation was filed. The administrative record included
materials that were submitted directly to BOGM without the same being identified in any
instances to any of the members of the public attending the public hearings.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Exemption to the Act enacted by the Legislature in 1987 was intended to exempt
from the Act's reclamation requirements those activities involving earth materials which in
place have no greater value than the surrounding material. This makes good sense in light
of the nature of the excavation procedures of the sand and gravel industry, particularly
keeping in mind the way that this industry removes its product as opposed to typical mining
activities of digging holes in the earth and piling up tailings. Moreover, the plain language
of the Act, noting as it does that there is no differentiation between consolidated and
unconsolidated materials, needs no interpretative rule or explanation when referring to the
Exemption. On the other hand, the Rule promulgated by BOGM is diametrically opposed
to the plain language of the Act in making a distinction between consolidated and
unconsolidated materials as well as in trying to place a size distinction between sand, gravel
and rock aggregate. Further, the Rule was promulgated without any regard to the testimony
submitted to BOGM as to the proper definition of sand, gravel and rock aggregate. The Rule
should be struck down as violation of the authority granted BOGM, as being in direct conflict
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with the plain meaning of the Act, and in violation of the rules of statutory construction that
the language of an act should not be interpreted such as to make any portion meaningless.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE RULE PROMULGATED BY BOGM IS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH
EITHER THE LANGUAGE OR THE INTENT OF THE ACT AND ITS
EXEMPTION.
A.

The phrase "sand, gravel, and rock aggregate" as a term of art indicates
given earth material's lack of unique value when in relation to its
surrounding material.

Although the Act uses the terms "mineral deposit" and "mineral matter/' the
Legislature has never expressly defined the term "mineral." Nevertheless, prior to when the
Act was initially passed in 1975, there had already been one prior major decision by this
Court defining a mineral as "any form of earth, rock, or metal of greater value than the
enclosing country of the superficial soil." State Land Board v. State Dept. of Fish & Game.
408 P.2d 707, 708 n.3 (Utah 1965). In that case, this Court was asked to decide whether or
not "sand and gravel" are minerals. This Court found that they are not because sand and
gravel are not "more valuable than the land in which they are contained." Id at 708. This
Court also talked about sand and gravel as "these ordinary materials of the earth's surface."
Id. Finally, this Court noted that in exceptional circumstances "there might be some area
where sand and gravel are so scarce and difficult to obtain that a deposit of those materials
would have such an extraordinary value within that area that they could properly be
7

considered as coming within the definition of'mineral...'" 14. at 708-09 (emphasis added).
In each instance, this Court emphasized that for any given material to be a mineral, it must
be inherently more valuable with respect to the materials surrounding it. As thus used, "sand
and gravel" serves as a term of art to refer to material that does not have any unique or
extraordinary value as distinguished from surrounding material.
Cases outside of Utah addressing the issue of what is a mineral have been divided in
their conclusion. See, e.g., the discussion in State Land Board at 709 (noting some courts
hold that if something is not a plant or animal, it must be a mineral). See also Watt v.
Western Nuclear. Inc.. 462 U.S. 36, 103 S.Ct. 2218 (1983), wherein "gravel" is defined as
a mineral. Notably, in neither State Land Board nor in any other case known to Appellant
that attempts to define sand and gravel has there been an effort to differentiate "sand" from
"gravel," such as by size or difference in composition. Even those cases that categorize sand
and gravel as mineral have done so without making size, geological characteristics or
location in geological formations the criteria on which such a decision was based. In short,
no case has been found which turns on such matters as sand being smaller than gravel or sand
and gravel not being minerals if found in alluvial formations.
Likewise in Larson Limestone, no attempt was made to distinguish "sand" from
"gravel," much less "sand and gravel" from "rock aggregate." Rather, all terms were
addressed collectively as a single term of art to indicate earth material with no unique value.
Larson Limestone concerned a sand and gravel pit that also produced high quality limestone.
8

In that case, DOGM notified Mr. Larson that because his entire operation disturbed more
than five acres of surface area, he was required to comply with the requirements of the Act.
Larson, in turn, argued that the Act only applied to the limited physical area of his quarry
where high-quality limestone was actually extracted. Because this portion of the quarry did
not exceed five acres, it remained a "small" mining operation, and thus afforded Larson
exemption from the Act. This Court disagreed, holding that because high-grade limestone
was extracted as part of the overall operation of the Larson pit, the entire pit was subject to
the requirements of the Act, even if the majority of the operation involved the extraction of
low-grade materials or waste rock, like sand, gravel, and rock aggregate. Therefore, under
Larson Limestone, if a sand and gravel operation were to include, for example, a small gold
mining operation, the entire extractive process would be subject to the Act.
While Larson Limestone never defined the sand, gravel, and rock aggregate
exemption (finding that it did not have to reach that issue), it did acknowledge that Larson
could "sell [his] waste rock as rock aggregate." Larson Limestone. 903 P.2d at 432. Further,
the part of Larson's operation that extracted low-quality materials was identified as a "rock
aggregate business" and distinguished from Larson's extraction of high-quality materials,
with the explanation that "[e]ven if part of Larson's operation is a rock aggregate operation
and is excluded from regulation, all the [other] areas . . . are also used in mining high quality
limestone . . . " Id. at 431. Thus, in Larson Limestone, the Court often used the phrase "rock
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aggregate" as interchangeable with "sand and gravel," namely, terms of art to describe those
earth materials with no special or unique value in relation to their surrounding material.
Courts presume that when the Legislature creates a statute, it uses each word carefully
and according to its "ordinary and accepted meaning." C.T. ex re I Taylor v. Johnson, 1999
UT 35, If 9,977 P.2d 479. By the time the Exemption was enacted in 1987, State Land Board
and other cases' usage of "sand and gravel" as a term of art connoting lack of unique value
while in place and in relation to surrounding materials was the ordinary and accepted
meaning of the phrase. Adding the term "rock aggregate" only served to emphasize that
definition. Thus, looking at the plain language and accepted usage of "sand, gravel, and rock
aggregate," there is no reason to break up that single term of art and segregate "sand" from
"gravel" from "rock aggregate" on the basis of particle size or geological formation. The
Rule, however, undertakes that exact exercise in attempting to interpret the Exemption, and
thus contorts the plain meaning and accepted usage of the Act's language. As a result, the
Rule is seriously flawed and cannot be upheld.
B.

The Act does not differentiate between consolidated and unconsolidated
earth material, yet the Rule does so in contravention of the Act,

Prior to enactment of the Exemption, the Legislature had made clear that the Act
would not be applied on the basis of certain materials' consolidation or lack thereof. This
intent is made clear by language in the Act which expressly declares that operations subject
to the Act include both consolidated and unconsolidated material. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-

10

8-4(3). Further, the Act is concerned with reclamation. The Act does not address, and there
is no justifiable reason to distinguish, reclamation on the basis of consolidated versus
unconsolidated materials. In short, to accept the Rule as a valid extension of the Act would
be to render the 1987 Exemption meaningless, or in other words to allow administrative
action to overturn a legislative mandate.
1.

The Act groups consolidated and unconsolidated materials together.

The plain language of the Act shows that the Legislature did not intend to distinguish
between consolidated and unconsolidated material when it created the Exemption. From its
inception, the Act defined "mineral deposit" as "an accumulation of mineral matter in the
form of consolidated rock, unconsolidated material . . ." Utah Code Ann. §40-8-4(3)(a)
(emphasis added). Significantly, this definition remained the same after the Exemption was
enacted in 1987. This language means that whether an operation is covered by the Act does
not depend on whether the material at issue is consolidated or unconsolidated. The Act
makes no distinction between minerals that are formed by alluvial processes and minerals
that are just plain bedrock. The definition of mineral does not turn on this type of nicety.
It follows, then, that any operation that extracts only material expressly exempted from the
Act is not subject to the requirements of the Act, regardless of whether the exempted
materials are consolidated or unconsolidated.
For the Rule to be valid, it must follow legislative intent, determined by the plain
language of the Act. See Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah. 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah
11

1993); see also Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984).
The Rule as promulgated by BOGM fails this test for the very reason that at its heart it
defines sand, gravel, and rock aggregate on the very distinctions that the Act refused to
utilize; the Rule defines sand, gravel and rock aggregate on the bases of both size and
geological formation, exempting only unconsolidated or alluvial material. Because the Rule
flies in the face of the intent and language of the Act, it cannot be sustained and must be
struck down.
2.

Reclamation of sand and gravel operations does not depend on
consolidated versus unconsolidated nature of material being
extracted.

The purpose of the Act is to ensure that Utah "mining operations" have proper
reclamation plans and carry them out. See Utah Code Ann. §40-8-2. Reclamation has been
found to be vital and in the public interest. For example, a coal mining operation might have
numerous tunnels under the ground to remove veins of coal. See Record at 21, 22, 270, and
271. Such a process often leaves large amounts of overburden and tailings as well as
potentially dangerous openings under the surface. Other types of mines leave large,
unsightly exposed holes that must be covered and re-landscaped. And other mining
operations sort through the extracted material, taking what they want and leaving the rest
behind in ugly and often unsafe piles.
In enacting the Exemption for sand, gravel, and rock aggregate, the Legislature was
justified in its approach. Rock aggregate operations are remarkably different from the
12

mining operations expressly covered by the Act, and thus entail different reclamation needs
and requirements. Rock aggregate operations, particularly currently active and modern
operations, start extraction at one point on a given piece of property and then move across
the property extracting material but generally leaving behind a level area suited for
residential neighborhoods, golf courses, and commercial use. See, e.g.. Gibbons & Reed Co.
v. North Salt Lake City. 431 P.2d 559, 564 (Utah 1967) ("there was evidence that the
plaintiffs have conducted their operations in such a way as to create a future beneficial use
since the materials will be removed so as to bring the grade down to a certain level on the
south side to about the level of U.S. 91 where the property will then be leveled off and thus
be used for other permissible uses"). Sand and gravel operations by their very nature extract
and use all the material, leaving nothing behind in sorted piles. The pit floor is almost
always level with adjacent highways or roads, and there are no tailings, slag heaps, big holes,
or subterranean tunnels to remediate, make safe or to cover up. Typically, the ground need
only be graded a bit and the sides of the pit slightly contoured in order to make it usable for
commercial or residential buildings. Record at 80-81. This is why sand and gravel
operations were traditionally left alone from typical mining reclamation requirements even
before 1987 and are now specifically exempted from the requirements of the Act.1

1

That is not to say the sand and gravel operations are without reclamation
requirements. To the contrary, they are governed by city and county reclamation
requirements for which bonds are posted. See Record at 86, 91.
13

Most importantly, once a pit has been exhausted for purposes of sand and gravel
operations, the reclamation necessary thereafter to make the area usable for other purposes
is not generally affected by whether during the course of extraction the material removed was
blasted loose (consolidated) or could be dug out with earth-moving equipment
(unconsolidated). Whether consolidated bedrock, "exposed at the surface of the earth or
overlain by unconsolidated material,"2 is removed or unconsolidated alluvial materials are
removed, the resulting area left behind looks much the same. If anything, once an operator
of a pit consisting of consolidated materials has exhausted that pit's resources, the remaining
pit would generally be more stable than an alluvial pit where the floors and walls left behind
could be unstable.
It is instructive that the Act never talks about bedrock or how it is blasted because the
Legislature created the Act to deal with the reclamation of mines, not with how the materials
are extracted. There are other agencies, like MSHA and the Utah Division of Air Quality,
that govern the extraction processes. Record at 87-92. Reclamation needs and requirements
for a given mine are determined by how the area is left after the extraction process is
completed, not by how hard or soft or loose or solid is the material extracted. Sand and
gravel operations, with or without bedrock, clearly do not implicate the problems with which
the Legislature was concerned when enacting the Act and the Exemption. For the purposes
of reclamation, the Legislature never intended to distinguish between consolidated and
2

Quoting the Rule.
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unconsolidated materials. However, because just such a distinction is the focus of the Rule,
it undermines if not vitiates the Act as it relates to the Exemption, and accordingly the Rule
must be struck down.
3.

The Rule is unworkable from a practical standpoint.

Another reason that the Exemption's plain language does not identify or otherwise
hinge on a consolidated/unconsolidated distinction is because of the confusion it would cause
in the field of regulation, as illustrated by the following hypothetical. In a given pit, the top
layer of unconsolidated alluvial material covers an uneven layer of consolidated bedrock.3
In order for the pit operator to remove the alluvial material he is left with two options under
the Rule. He could stop as soon as he encounters bedrock. However, to do so would require
him to close the pit without removing all of the alluvial material. However, if he chooses to
remove any of the bedrock, he subjects the entire pit to the requirements of the Act according
to the Rule, and as per Larson Limestone. Further, once he stops the pit operation, local
county or city reclamation rules generally require him to smooth out the pit floor and contour
its walls. However, sand and gravel material typically is not found naturally in smooth, flat
layers or contours. Thus, in order to comply with local law, the pit operator must remove any
bedrock jutting up from the otherwise smooth pit floor or part of the pit walls. So, despite

3

The diagram created by DOGM and found in the Record at 232 shows this

hypothetical.
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the operator's best efforts to avoid regulation by DOGM while at the same time comply with
local reclamation rules, he still finds himself subject to DOGM-the proverbial Catch 22.
C.

The Legislature did not intend to pass a meaningless piece of legislation
in the form of a meaningless Exemption to the Act.

Defining the Exemption in terms of unconsolidated or alluvial materials renders the
Exemption virtually meaningless. The Rule attempts to impose a condition or definition that
DOGM thought existed prior to the passage of the Exemption, namely, that DOGM had
authority over all sand and gravel operations where bedrock is found and blasted. The Rule
would thus formalize for DOGM the scope of administrative enforcement and rulemaking
authority which it assumed it had before the Exemption was passed in 1987. Thus the Rule
would perform an end-run around the otherwise clear language and intent of the Act by
formally conveying more authority to DOGM than the Act and its Exemption specifically
grant to DOGM. Thus, the Rule renders the Exemption meaningless. Yet Utah law is clear
that "[statutes should be read so as to avoid making any of their provisions 'surplusage and
meaningless.'" Ferro v. Utah Dept. Of Commerce Div. of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, 828 P.2d 507, 514 (Utah App. 1992). Because the Rule's emphasis on
consolidation and size of material eliminates any purpose for the Exemption, the Rule's
interpretation of the Exemption is at direct variance with the Legislature's intent in enacting
the Exemption in the first place.
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D.

"Rock aggregate" is a commercial term indicating end use of processed
product, not a recognized geological term that would indicate pre-existing
natural state.

BOGM has claimed that the Rule defines "sand, gravel, and rock aggregate" in
geologic terms, based on the size and location of material in the earth. Record at 151, 1624
(BOGM's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the Larson Limestone matter
("Order").) See also Record at 36 ("[t]he proposed definitions for sand and gravel are taken
from the informally proposed Division version and the rock aggregate definition is extracted
from the board order in the Larson Limestone matter"). In the BOGM Order, BOGM cites
to authoritative geologic definitions from the AGI Glossary of Geology and the USBM
Dictionary of Mining, Mineral and Related Terms for the terms "sand" and "gravel." See
Record at 166. However, BOGM does not cite to any such authority in support of its
definition for "rock aggregate." Rather, BOGM relies solely upon the "big rocks made into
little rocks" statement made by Representative Christensen for support of its definition for
"rock aggregate." See Record at 162. Thus, BOGM contorts logic to make the dubious
conclusion that "it is clear that the Legislature intended the term [rock aggregate] to be
defined in a geologic sense" without any real authoritative support for such a conclusion.
4

Volume 1 of the administrative record (filed with this Court as Record at 27252) appears to have a number of pages out of place. Thus, for example, those pages
stamped by BOGM as 000069 through 000094 have been marked for the Record as pages
32 to 57. However, the page stamped 000068 is marked for the Record as page 126 and the
page stamped 000095 is marked for the Record as page 127. For consistency, all references
to the administrative record in this Brief will be by reference to the pages as marked by the
lower court for this appeal.
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BOGM's failure to cite to an authoritative source, such as a dictionary of geology or mining,
for its definition of "rock aggregate" stems from the fact that "rock aggregate" is simply not
a geological term.
As further support for its geologic definitions for "sand" and "gravel," DOGM created
and presented BOGM with its Diagrammatic Cross-section of earth material illustrating the
locations of sand and gravel within surrounding earth material. See Record at 232. While
the diagram clearly shows the locations of sand and gravel, there is no reference whatsoever
to "rock aggregate." Once again, DOGM's failure to identify "rock aggregate" in its diagram
is due to the fact that "rock aggregate" does not occur in nature. It is processed end-use
material.
Bryce Tripp is a geologist with the Utah Geologic Survey ("UGS"), which is a
division of the Utah Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"). See Record at 237. In a
memorandum dated November 19, 1997, Mr. Tripp wrote, with respect to the proposed
definition of "rock aggregate," the following: "It is unfortunate that the legislature chose this
term since aggregate is a use term rather than being descriptive of material in the ground."
Record at 259 (emphasis added).
Tony Gallegos is a reclamation engineer with DOGM, also a division of the DNR.
See Record at 237. In his comments dated December 19, 1997, Mr. Gallegos wrote the
following regarding the definition of "rock aggregate": "If we are going to modify the statute
let's remove the term "rock aggregate " (which is a definition based on end use) and replace
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it with something more useful or just leave it out." Record at 216 (emphasis added).
Buck Rose on behalf of the Utah County Community Development Department, in
his November 17, 1997 letter to Lowell Braxton, DOGM's Director, agreed with the
conclusion reached by Messrs. Tripp and Gallegos of UGS and DOGM, respectively, and
even provided more legal support for their respective conclusions: "Black's Law Dictionary
defines aggregate as material consisting largely of rock, gravel and sand used for
construction and surfacing of highways or as a component part, informing concrete for
construction (Pioneer Gravel v. Diamond Iron. 72 F.2d 161)." Record at 246 (emphasis
added).
The case of Pioneer Gravel v. Diamond Iron. 72 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1934), cited to by
Buck Rose on behalf of Utah County in his aforementioned letter, provides in pertinent part
as follows: "This patent covers a portable machine for making and handling aggregates used
in highway construction. 'Aggregates' is the name for materials consisting largely of rock,
gravel, and sand used for the construction and surfacing of highways or, as a component part,
in forming concrete for such construction." Id. See also Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Const.
Co.. 450 P.2d 985 (Utah 1969) (". . . in crushing aggregate (rock and gravel) for use in
highway construction"); Standard Industries. Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp.. 475 F.2d 220 (C.A.10
(Okla.) 1973) ("'asphaltic concrete,' which is made by mixing aggregates, such as sand,
crushed rock, and the like, with liquid asphalt"). The following cases also use the term
"aggregate" or "rock aggregate" to mean sand and gravel processing operations rather than
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naturally occurring earth material: U.S. v. 179.26 Acres of Land in Douglas County, Kansas,
644 F.2d 367, (C.A.10 (Kan.) 1981); Sampson Const. Co. v. Farmers Co-op. Elevator Co..
Marshall. OkL 382 F.2d 645 (C.A.10 (Okla.) 1967); U.S. for Use and Benefit of Pool Const.
Co. v. Smith Road Const. Co.. 227 F.Supp. 315 (N.D.Okla. 1964); Youngren v. John W.
Lloyd Const. Co.. 450 P.2d 985 (Utah 1969); Ferro v. Utah Dept. Of Commerce Div. of
Occupational and Professional Licensing. 828 P.2d 507 (Utah App. 1992).
Clearly, "rock aggregate" is not a geologic term. Rather, unlike "sand" and "gravel,"
it is a commercial term used in the rock aggregate business which describes the end use of
certain processed earth material, not the material as it is situated naturally in the ground. See.
e.g.. Larson Limestone at 431 (Larson Limestone's business is referred to as both a "rock
aggregate business" and a "rock aggregate operation"); Utah Mining Association letter dated
July 8, 1988 (referring to "rock aggregate operations" and "rock aggregate producers")
(Record at 34); letter dated February 7, 1997 from Lowell Braxton, DOGM Director, to
BOGM (hand-written language has been inserted in connection with "Rock Aggregate,"
which reads: "which is part of S&G [(sand & gravel)] operation") (Record at 333).
As discussed above, BOGM relies solely on Representative Christensen's statement
as a basis for its contention that "rock aggregate" is somehow a recognized geologic term.
However, Representative Christensen's statement does not support BOGM's position.
According to BOGM, Representative Christensen stated: "Sometimes when you deal with
sand and gravel, House Members, you get some big rocks in there and you kinda [sic] make
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small ones out of them. This is the aggregate part of it." BOGM Order, Record at 151, 162.
Representative Christensen's concept of making small rocks from big rocks is descriptive of
the very process described in Pioneer Gravel, supra, which is the process of crushing and
processing pre-existing rock material to make end-product rock aggregate. This is the very
process carried out by aggregate businesses.
In creating the Rule, BOGM has undergone a two-step process in attempting to
formulate a definition of the exception for "sand, gravel and rock aggregate." First, it broke
the single collective term into three separate terms: "sand," "gravel," and "rock aggregate."
Then it tried to create a geological definition for "rock aggregate" solely from the isolated
comment of Representative Christensen and absent any clearly accepted geological definition
for or consensus on such a term. Both steps are improper and contrary to the clear language
of the Act as well as the evidence before BOGM. Such a contrived definition is improper
and should be rejected.
E.

The Rule should be overturned because it was promulgated outside the
clear scope of BOGM's delegated authority.

The limits on a governmental agency's authority with respect to a given statute are
defined by the Legislature. Agencies can never promulgate rules that are "contrary to the
statute [or] beyond its scope." Draughton v. Department of Financial Institutions, State of
Utah. 1999 UT App 042, ^ 5, 975 P.2d 935. If there is any reasonable doubt as to whether
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an agency has power, the issue should be resolved against the agency. See Williams v.
Public Service Com'n of Utah. 754 P.2d 42, 50 (Utah 1988).
In this case, BOGM received a specific grant of authority from the Legislature. It can
make rules reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of the Act. See Utah Code Ann.
§40-8-6(1). The purpose of the Act is to ensure that all Utah mines (excluding sand, gravel,
and rock aggregate operations from that category) are reclaimed under the supervision and
guidelines of DOGM. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-2. Because the purpose of and intent
behind the Act does not encompass sand, gravel, and rock aggregate operations, BOGM
cannot disregard and go beyond clear legislative purpose and intent by promulgating rules
affecting those very operations. Yet the Rule regulates nearly every such operation despite
the Legislature's clear intent to exclude just such operations. Likewise, the Rule oversteps
the purpose of the Act and the intent of the Legislature by categorizing sand, gravel, and rock
aggregate as particles of particular sizes but not solid or consolidated material. As shown
above, this interpretation leads to contradictory and sometimes absurd results (not the least
of which would ex nihilo bestow DOGM with more authority than it had before the
Exemption was passed). Because the Rule goes beyond what is necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Act as well as contradicts and undermines clear legislative intent, BOGM
overstepped its authority in promulgating the Rule, and this Court accordingly has a duty to
invalidate the Rule. See Draughton. 975 P.2d at 937.
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II.

THE RULE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Aside from the fundamental problems with the Rule's substance noted earlier above,

the process by which BOGM promulgated the Rule is also flawed, because the Rule is not
supported by substantial evidence or authoritative testimony. Indeed, the administrative
record is quite persuasive in establishing that BOGM completely ignored the authoritative
testimony presented to it and, in complete contradiction of said testimony, chose to follow
a course which has no support in law or in the geological industry terminology presented
during the rulemaking.
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." Larson Limestone at 430 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). In determining whether BOGM's Rule is supported by substantial evidence,
the Court should review the whole administrative record5 and consider both evidence that
supports BOGM's findings and evidence that fairly detracts from them.6 See Department of
Air Force v. Swider. 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App. 1991) (u[i]n applying the substantial

5

The Court should give no deference whatsoever to the lower court's initial
appellate review. The lower court conducted no independent inquiry into BOGM's actions.
Rather, the lower court based its decision on a review of the administrative record. This
Court is just as capable of reviewing the administrative record as is the lower court. See
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 1991) ("[w]e give no
deference to the district court's initial appellate review since it was a review of the record,
which this court is just as capable of reviewing as the district court") (citations omitted).
6

In addition to reviewing the administrative record, the Court should review the
letter dated February 2, 1987 from DOGM to Staker Paving. Record at 609-610.
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evidence test, we review the 'whole record' before the court, and consider both evidence that
supports the Board's findings and evidence that fairly detracts from them").
A review of the administrative record clearly shows that BOGM, in enacting the Rule,
and particularly in attempting to redefine the term "rock aggregate" in geological terms,
completely ignored the testimony presented to it, including testimony from its own experts.
BOGM has attempted to define "rock aggregate" in geological terms contrary to and in spite
of such testimony.
As noted earlier in this Brief, without exception, every person who gave authoritative
testimony before BOGM regarding the Rule's definition of "sand, gravel, and rock
aggregate" uniformly declared that "rock aggregate" has no geological meaning, but is a term
used in the sand and gravel industry to denote certain types of end-use product.
Unable to otherwise identify a valid or accepted geological definition of "rock
aggregate" that suited its purposes, BOGM undertook an interesting bootstrap operation in
order to create its own geologic definition. BOGM reached back to the material it presented
to this Court in the Larson Limestone case. See Record at 36 ("the rock aggregate definition
is extracted from the board order in the Larson Limestone matter"). However, the analysis
made in the DOGM Order for Larson Limestone came not by reason of any hearings before
BOGM, but rather was part of the justification for the result reached by BOGM and its legal
counsel to defend its Order. Inasmuch as this Court in Larson Limestone accepted neither
BOGM's arguments as to the definition of "rock aggregate" nor that portion of its Order
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which rested on the same assumptions (although admittedly it did not directly rule on them
either), BOGM had no valid basis to create the Rule resting as it did solely on its earlier
decision.
More importantly, however, is the fact that the Rule lacks substantive support.
Ultimately, the only support BOGM can cite for the Rule is the brief isolated comment made
by Representative Christensen, as discussed earlier.

However, as explained earlier,

Representative Christensen's comment gives BOGM no substantive support (particularly
when reviewed in its proper context) because it actually supports AGCU's position that "rock
aggregate" is a term used in the sand and gravel industry to describe end use.
In short, BOGM, unable to find any definition supportable in law or in fact to equate
to the definition it chose to give "rock aggregate" in its Rule, simply reverted back to its own
arguments in the Larson Limestone case, using these arguments as a basis for its definition
which purports to define "rock aggregate" in geological terms without any support for the
same whatsoever in the administrative record, in law or in fact. BOGM's blatant disregard
for clear statutory language or legislative intent in its rulemaking process nullifies any
deference to administrative expertise that this Court would normally accord to an
administrative body. The Rule that was ultimately promulgated is designed to eviscerate the
Exemption, was crafted as such, and should not be countenanced nor approved by this Court.
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III.

THE LOWER COURT USED THE WRONG STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The applicable standard of review that the lower court should have applied when

reviewing the rule and the administrative record was a correction of error standard in
reviewing the Rule. The lower court rejected the correction-of-error standard in favor of a
"tolerable limits of reason standard," relying on the case of Williams v. Public Service
Com'n of Utah. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988) as its authority for adopting such a standard. The
lower court then went on to find "the Board's findings supporting the rule are rationally
based." Record at 647-49.
However, Williams was neither binding nor persuasive authority at the time of the
lower court's ruling because Williams was decided and issued before the State adopted the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), and its sister statute, the Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act ("UARA"). The adoption of UAPA and UARA has
changed the law in Williams and calls for application of the correction of error standard in
the instant case.
Williams was a rulemaking case. However, the Williams court, in enunciating the
three-pronged standard of review, did so in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16,
which governed the court's review of the subject administrative rule at that point in time.
Williams at 50. As of January 1, 1988, however, Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 was repealed.
In its place, the Legislature adopted the UAPA. Thus, had Williams been decided after the
adoption of the UAPA, the Williams court, in choosing the relevant standard of review,
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would have relied, at least in part, on case law arising under the UAPA. Further, the relevant
portions of the UAPA and the UARA are substantially similar and, in such situations, courts
frequently look to one statute for guidance as to the other. See, e.g., Graco Fishing and
Rental Tools. Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration. Inc.. 766 P.2d 1074, 1078 (Utah 1988) ("[t]his
Court has established the general rule that because of the common purpose of these lien and
contractors bond statutes, and their practically identical language, adjudications as to what
is lienable under the former are helpful in determining the proper application of the latter")
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
In SEMECO Industries. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Com'n. 849 P.2d
1167, 1170 (Utah 1993), this Court stated: "Before UAPA, this court had developed clear
standards of review to apply to agency actions." Utah Dept. of Administrative Services v.
Public Service Com'n. 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983), cited to in Williams, "contains the most
comprehensive guide to pre-UAPA standards." SEMECO at 1170.
Administrative Services established three levels of pre-UAPA review of
agency action: (1) a no-deference, "correction of error" standard regarding
interpretations of general questions of law; (2) an intermediate-deference,
"reasonableness and rationality" standard regarding mixed questions of law
and fact, questions of special law, questions of the application of law to fact,
and questions of "ultimate fact"; and (3) a great-deference, "evidence of any
substance whatever" standard regarding findings of basic fact.
SEMECO at 1171 (citing Administrative Services at 608-612). "Section 63-46b-16(4) of
UAPA7 upset these previously settled standards without indicating what standards should
7

This section of UAPA is the equivalent of Section 63-46a-12.1(4) of UARA.
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replace them." Id. The SEMECO court then went on to state which standards of review
should be applied to each of the UAPA subsections.
Subsection 4(b) of the UAPA addresses challenges based on allegations that "the
agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute."8

This Court, after

reviewing relevant case law, noted that "challenges under subsection (4)(b) also presented
questions of general law appropriate for correction of error review." id. See also Bennion
v. ANR Production Co., 819 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1991) (applying correction of error
standard to challenge made under subsection 4(b)). Clearly, where an administrative rule is
challenged as extending an agency's jurisdiction beyond that conferred by its governing
statute, the correction of error standard should be applied.
Further, even if SEMECO and UARA's sister statute, UAPA, were to be disregarded
as guidance (which the lower court did) the correction of error standard would still be
applicable in any event. The correction of error standard applies to "interpretations of
general questions of law." Administrative Services at 608. An example of a correction-oferror type review is whether an agency has "acted beyond its statutory jurisdiction or
authority." id. In the instant case, UAGC is challenging the Rule, for the most part, because
BOGM acted beyond its statutory authority in promulgating the Rule.

8

The UAPA's sister provision, subsection (a)(i) of the UARA, provides "the
rule violates constitutional or statutory law or the agency does not have legal authority to
make the rule."
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Thus, the correction-of-error standard is appropriate standard of review in this case,
and should have been applied by the lower court. The lower court was presented the same
argument and authority detailed above in relation to the motions for summary judgment
below. Yet, despite being briefed on issues of the repeal of past standards and adoption of
new standards for administrative rulemaking, the lower court rejected the correction-of-error
standard and applied the "tolerable limits of reason" standard derived from the obsolete
Williams language.
The lower court's adoption of this obsolete standard of review is incorrect for at least
two fundamental reasons. First, the lower court failed to address in any way the repeal of
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-14, and instead went on to apply a repealed standard of review as if
it had never been repealed, and did so without invoking satisfactory authority for the
adoption of that standard (invoking only the now-outmoded Williams case, which was
decided before the repeal of § 54-7-14). Second, the lower court wrongly applied an
(outmoded) intermediate "reasonable" standard of review (previously) applicable to the
question of substantial evidence to the question of exceeding the scope of authority, which
is governed by the stricter no-deference/correction-of-error standard. In other words, the
court was faced with two issues arguably governed by two different standards of review, and
chose to resolve both of them under one standard with no attempt to explain the grounds on
which it did so. So on at least two fundamental levels, the lower court's adoption of the

29

"reasonable" intermediate standard of review was incorrect, and the resultant ruling premised
on such an incorrect standard should be overturned.
IV. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO GIVE OPPORTUNITY FOR
DISCOVERY.
As can be seen from the administrative record, a number of letters and other similar
written materials had been submitted to BOGM during the course of the rulemaking process.
Furthermore, at least DOGM, and possibly BOGM, had in their files certain correspondence
and analyses relating to the Rule and to the Act which were never included as part of the
administrative record as provided to the lower court. Given this disparity, it became
imperative for AGCU to determine what materials BOGM actually had before it and relied
on, as well as to what extent BOGM took into consideration materials in DOGM's files but
not otherwise appearing in the administrative record in reaching its decision. Accordingly,
ACGU made discovery requests in this vein.
However, ACGU's discovery requests were resisted, and ultimately the lower court
granted BOGM's Motion for a Protective Order. Record at 549-552. That protective order
was improper under the circumstances because of the less thaa open and transparent nature
of the rulemaking process as well as ACGU's lack of access to materials that may have
actually been considered by BOGM but not otherwise included in the administrative record.
Therefore, if for any reason this Court is inclined to affirm the lower court's holding, it
should not do so until after AGCU has had an opportunity to conduct further discovery in
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order to flesh out exactly what materials and information were actually considered by BOGM
but not otherwise disclosed to the public during the rulemaking process. For that matter,
AGCU should also be entitled to take the deposition of Representative Christensen, since he
is the one person on whose statements BOGM basically rests its entire case.
CONCLUSION
The Rule should be declared invalid because: (1) BOGM has exceeded its delegated
scope of authority in attempting, through the rulemaking process, to bring subject matter
under its administrative control that is expressly exempted from such control by legislative
act, and thereby nullify the clear wording and legislative intent behind the affected statute;
and (2) there was not substantial evidence presented to support the Rule's promulgation.
Furthermore: (1) the lower court's ruling should be accorded no deference since it applied
the incorrect standard of review in reviewing the Rule; and (2) the lower court erred in
disallowing discovery into material that DOGM/BOGM had in its department files in this
matter but did not include in the administrative record, and which may have had any bearing
in the rulemaking process. For the foregoing reasons, both the Rule and the lower court's
ruling should be overturned.
DATED this N
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MINES AND MINING
Section
40-8-20.
40-8-21.

40-8-22.
40-8-23.

Applicability.
Temporary suspension or termination of operations — Notice to division — Evaluation and
inspection — Release of surety — Evidence
of compliance.
Division cooperation — Agreements.
Effective dates — Exceptions.

40-8-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah
Mined Land Reclamation Act."
1975

CHAPTER8
MINED LAND RECLAMATION
Section
40-8-1.
4G^8-2L
40-8-3.
40^8-4.
4C>^8-5.

40-8-6.
40-8-7'
40-8-8.
40-8-9.
40-8-10.
40-8-11.
40-8-12.
40-8-12.5.
40-8-13.

40-8-14.
40-8-15.
40-8-16.
40-8-17.
40-8-18.
40-8-19.

Short title.
Legislative findings.
Purpose.
Definitions.
Authority to enforce chapter—Coordination of
procedures—Department of Environmental
Quality.
Board — Powers, functions and duties.
Board and division—Authority — No retroactive effect for rules.
Board authority to act — Entry of order —
Confidential data — Proceedings in case of
violations.
Evasion of chapter or rules — Penalties —
Limitations of actions.
Notice.
Budget of administrative expenses — Procedure — Division authority to appoint or
employ consultants.
Objectives.
Reclamation required.
Notice of intention required prior to mining
operations — Assurance of reclamation required in notice of intention — When contents confidential — Approval of notice of
intention not required for small mining operations — Procedure for reviewing notice of
intention.
Surety requirement — Liability of small mining operations for failure to reclaim — Forfeiture of surety.
Notice of commencement to division — Operations and progress report
Approved notice of intention valid for life of
operation — Withdrawal, withholding, or
refusal of approval — Procedure and basis.
Responsibility of operator to comply with applicable rules, regulations and ordinances —
Inspections.
Notice of intention to revise operations —
Procedure.
Transfer of mininc onpratifm nnrlor annmvo^

40-8-2. Legislative findings.
The Utah Legislature finds that
(1) A mining industry is essential to the economic and
physical well-being of the state of Utah and the nation.
(2) It is necessary to alter the surface of the earth to
extract minerals required by our society, but this should
be done in such a way as to minimize undesirable effects
on the surroundings.
(3) Mined land should be reclaimed so as to prevent
conditions detrimental to the general safety and welfare
of the citizens of the state and to provide for the subsequent use of the lands affected. Reclamation requirements must be adapted to the diversity of topographic,
chemical, climatic, biologic, geologic, economic, and social
conditions in the areas where mining takes place.
1975
40-8-3. Purpose.
The purpose of this act is to provide that from the effective
date of the act, except as otherwise provided in this act, all
mining in the state shall include plans for reclamation of the
land affected.
1975
40-8-4. Definitions.
As used in this chapter
(1) (a) "Approved notice of intention'' means a formally
filed notice of intention to commence mining operations, including revisions to it, which has been approved under Section 40-8-13.
(b) An approved notice of intention is not required
for small mining operations.
(2) "Board" means the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining.
(3) (a) "Deposit" or "mineral deposit" means an accumulation of mineral matter in the form of consolidated rock, unconsolidated material, solutions, or
otherwise occurring on the surface, beneath the surface, or in the waters of the land from which any
product useful to man may be produced, extracted, or
obtained or which is extracted by underground mining methods for underground storage.
(b) "Deposit" or "mineral deposit" excludes sand,
gravel, rock aggregate, water, geothermal steam, and
oil and gas as defined in Title 40, Chapter 6, but
includes oil shale and bituminous sands extracted by
mining operations.
(4) "Development" means the work performed in relation to a deposit following its discovery but prior to and in
contemplation of production mining operations, aimed at,
but not limited to, preparing the site for mining operations, defining further the ore deposit by drilling or other
means, conducting pilot plant operations, constructing
roads or ancillary facilities, and other related activities.
(5) "Division" means the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining.
(6) (a) "Exploration" means surface-disturbing activities conducted for the purpose of discovering a deposit
OT* m i n e r a l
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specific areas in which deposits or mineral deposits
are most likely to exist.
(b) "Exploration" includes, but is not limited to:
sinking shafts; tunneling; drilling holes and digging
pits or cuts; building of roads, and other access ways;
and constructing and operating other facilities related to these activities.
(7) "Land affected" means the surface and subsurface of
an area within the state where mining operations are
being or will be conducted, including, but not limited to:
(a) on-site private ways, roads, and railroads; (b) land
excavations; (c) exploration sites; (d) drill sites or workings; (e) refuse banks or spoil piles; (f) evaporation or
settling ponds; (g) stockpiles; (h) leaching dumps; (i)
placer areas; (j) tailings ponds or dumps; and (k) work,
parking, storage, or waste discharge areas, structures,
and facilities. All lands shall be excluded t h a t would
otherwise be includable as land affected but which have
been reclaimed in accordance with an approved plan or
otherwise, as may be approved by the board, and lands in
which mining operations have ceased prior to July 1,
1977.
(8) (a) "Mining operation" means those activities conducted on the surface of the land for the exploration
for, development of, or extraction of a mineral deposit,
including, but not limited to, surface mining and the
surface effects of underground and in situ mining,
on-site transportation, concentrating, milling, evaporation, and other primary processing.
(b) "Mining operation" does not include: the extraction of sand, gravel, and rock aggregate; the extraction of oil and gas as defined in Title 40, Chapter 6;
the extraction of geothermal steam; smelting or refining operations; off-site operations and transportation; or reconnaissance activities and activities which
will not cause significant surface resource disturbance or involve the use of mechanized earth-moving
equipment such as bulldozers or backhoes.
(9) "Notice of intention" means a notice to commence
mining operations, including revisions to the notice.
(10) "Off-site" means the land areas that are outside of
or beyond the on-site land.
(11) "On-site" means the surface lands on or under
which surface or underground mining operations are
conducted. A series of related properties under the control
of a single operator but separated by small parcels of land
controlled by others will be considered a single site unless
excepted by the division.
(12) "Operator" means any natural person, corporation, association, partnership, receiver, trustee, executor,
administrator, guardian, fiduciary, agent, or other organization or representative of any kind, either public or
private, owning, controlling, or managing a mining operation or proposed mining operation.
(13) "Owner" means any natural person, corporation,
association, partnership, receiver, trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, fiduciary, agent, or other organization or representative of any kind, either public or private,
owning, controlling, or managing a mineral deposit or the
surface of lands employed in mining operations.

(14) "Reclamation" means actions performed during or
after mining operations to shape, stabilize, revegetate, or
otherwise treat the land affected in order to achieve a
safe, stable, ecological condition and use which will be
consistent with local environmental conditions.
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40-8-5. Authority to enforce chapter — Coordination
of procedures — Department of Environmental Quality.
(1) (a) The board and the division have jurisdiction and
authority over all persons and property, both, public and
private, necessary to enforce this chapter.
(b) Any delegation of authority to any other state
officer, board, division, commission, or agency to administer any or all other laws of this state relating'to mined
land reclamation is withdrawn and the authority is unqualifiedly conferred upon the board and division as
provided in this chapter.
(c) Nothing in this chapter, however, shall affect in any
way the right of the landowner or any public agency
having proprietary authority under other provisions of
law to administer lands within the state to include in'any
lease, license, bill of sale, deed, right-of-way, permit,
contract, or other instrument, conditions as appropriate,
provided that the conditions are consistent with this
chapter and the rules adopted under it.
(2) (a) Where federal or local laws or regulations require
operators to comply with mined land reclamation procedures separate from those provided for in this chapter, the
board and division shall make every effort to have its
rules and procedures accepted by the other governing
bodies as complying with their respective requirements.
(b) The objective in coordination is to minimize the
need for operators and prospective operators to undertake
duplicating, overlapping, or conflicting compliance procedures. .
(3) Nothing in this chapter is intended to abrogate or
interfere with any powers or duties of the Department of
Environmental Quality.
1W6

40-8-6. Board — Powers, functions and duties.
In addition to those provided in Title 40, Chapter 6,'the
board has the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) l b enact rules according to the procedures and
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46a, that are reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter.
(2) l b hold hearings and to issue orders or other
appropriate instruments based upon the results of those
hearings.
(3) To issue emergency orders according to the requirements and provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b.
(4) l b do all other things and take such other actions
within the purposes of this act as may be necessary to
enforce its provisions.
1W7

40-8-7. Board and division — Authority — No retroactive effect for rules,
(1) The board and the division may require:
(a) identification of the ownership of all interests in
mineral deposits included within a notice of intention,
including surface ownership of all land affected in the
notice;
(b) the making and filing, with the division, of true and
correct copies of underground and surface mine maps;
drill hole locations; area maps of existing and proposed
operations; and information relating to volumes of materials moved or proposed to be moved or extracted, which
are related to mined land reclamation;
(c) the plugging or capping of drill holes and the closing
of shafts and tunnels, made in mining operations after
those facilities have served their intended purposes;
(d) the reclamation of lands affected by mining operations after the effective date of this chapter having due

surety to guarantee the performance of the duty to reclaim the land affected in accordance with approved plans
based upon on-site conditions; to treat each drill hole,
shaft, or tunnel as may be required; and to pay legally
determined public liability and property damage claims
resulting from mining operations. The board shall promulgate rules concerning surety for mining operations;
(f) that every operator who conducts mining operations
in the state maintain suitable records and make periodic
reports to the division in furtherance of the purposes of
this chapter,
(g) that with respect to all mining operations, a notice
of intention is filed with and, if required by this chapter,
approved by the division before any such mining operations are commenced or continued pursuant to Section
40-8-23;
(h) the suspension of mining operations in case of
emergency conditions;
(i) the payment offixed,uniform, nonescalating permit
fees; or
(j) that mining operations be conducted so as to minimize or prevent hazards to public health and safety.
(2) No rule established by the board with respect to mined
land reclamation shall have retroactive effect on existing
reclamation plans included as a part of an approved notice of
intention to commence mining operations which was approved
prior to the effective date of the rule.
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40-8-8. Board authority to act — Entry of order —
Confidential data — Proceedings in case of
violations.
(1) The board may act by:
(a) filing a notice of agency action; or
(b) responding to a request for agency action initiated
, - by any affected person.
(2) (a) The board shall enter its order within 60 days after
the hearing.
(b) All orders entered by the board shall be:
(i) entered in books to be kept by the board for that
purpose;
(ii) indexed; and
(iii) public records open for inspection at all times
during reasonable office hours.
(c) Confidential data disclosed under this chapter shall
be protected and not become public records, except as
provided in Subsection 40-8-13(2).
<3) (a) Whenever it appears that any person, owner, or
operator is violating any provision of this chapter, or any
rule or order made under the authority of this chapter, the
board shall file a notice of agency action, and shall hold an
adjudicative proceeding.
(b) All persons known to be affected by the violation,
and the alleged violators, shall be given opportunity to be
heard.
(c) If, following this hearing, the board finds a violation, it maj".
(i) issue an abatement or compliance order, or
(ii) bring suit in the name of the state to restrain
the violator from continuing the violation in any court
in the state having jurisdiction in the county of
residence of any defendant or in the county where the
violation is alleged to have occurred.
(d) In that suit, the court may grant injunctions, prohibitory and mandatory, including temporary restraining
orders and temporary injunctions.
(e) Failure to comply with the terms of any injunction
or order issued by the court is prima facie evidence of
contempt and is punishable by the imposition of a penalty

addition to any fine otherwise imposed for the violation of
this chapter.
(4) If a suit is filed against an operator, and a preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order is issued that would
result in an operator being or ed to close his mining
operation, the party instituting th *wsuit shall give security
according to Rule 65A(c) of the Uta~ Rules of Civil Procedure.
1987

40-8-9. Evasion of chapter or rules — Penalties —
Limitations of actions.
(1) (a) Any person, owner, or operator who willfully or
knowingly evades this chapter, or who for the purpose of
evadingtikischapter or any rule or order issued under this
chapter, willfully or knowingly makes or causes to be
made any false entry in any report, record, account, or
memorandum required by this chapter, or by the rule or
order, or who willfully or knowingly omits or causes to be
omitted from any report, record, account, or memorandum, full, true, and correct entries as required by this
chapter, or by the rule or order, or who willfully or
knowingly removesfromthis state or destroys, mutilates,
alters, or falsifies any record, account, or memorandum, is
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, is subject to
a fine of not more than $10,000 for each violation.
(b) Each day of willful failure to comply with an emergency order is a separate violation.
(2) No suit, action, or other proceeding based upon a violation of this chapter, or any rule or order issued under this
chapter, may be commenced or maintained unless the suit,
action, or proceeding is commenced within two years from
date of the alleged violation.
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40-8-10. Notice.
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any notification required by this chapter shall be given by the board or
division by personal service to individuals directly affected
and by one publication in a daily newspaper of general
circulation in Salt Lake City, Utah, and in all newspapers of
general circulation published in the county or counties in
which the land affected is situated.
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40-8-11. Budget of administrative expenses — Procedure — Division authority to appoint or employ consultants.
(1) The division, with the approval of the board, shall
prepare a budget of the administrative expenses in carrying
out the provisions of this act for the fiscal year next following
the convening of the Legislature. This budget shall be submitted to the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources for inclusion in the governor's appropriation request to the Legislature.
(2) The division shall have authority to appoint or employ
technical support or consultants in the pursuit of the objectives of this act and shall be responsible for coordination with
other agencies in matters relating to mined land reclamation
and the application of related laws.
1983
40-8-12. Objectives.
The objectives of mined land reclamation are:
(1) to return the land, concurrently with mining or
within a reasonable amount of time thereafter, to a stable
ecological condition compatible with past, present, and
probable future local land uses;
;
(2) to minimize or prevent present and future on-site or
off-site environmental degradation caused by mining operations to the ecologic and hydrologic regimes and to
meet other pertinent state and federal regulations regarding air and water quality standards and health and safety

(3) to minimize or prevent future hazards to public
safety and welfare.
1887
40-8-12.5. Reclamation required.
Every operator shall be obligated to conduct reclamation
and shall be responsible for the costs and expenses thereof.
1987

40-8-13. Notice of intention required prior to mining
operations — Assurance of. reclamation required in notice of intention — When contents
confidential —Approval of notice of intention
not required for small mining operations —
Procedure for reviewing notice of intention.
(1) (a) Before any operator begins mining operations, or
continues mining operations pursuant to Section 40-8-23,
he shall file a notice of intention for each individual
mining operation with the division.
(b) The notice of intention for small mining operations
shall include a statement that the operator shall conduct
reclamation as required by rules promulgated by the
board.
(c) The notice of intention for mining operations other
than small mining operations shall include a plan for
reclamation of the lands affected as required by rules
promulgated by the board.
(2) Information provided in the notice of intention and its
attachments relating to the location, size, or nature of the
deposit that is marked confidential by the operator shall be
protected as confidential information by the board and the
division and is not a matter of public record unless the board
or division obtains a written release from the operator, or until
the mining operation has been terminated as provided in
Subsection 40-8-21(2).
(3) (a) Within 30 days from the receipt of a notice of
intention, the division shall complete its review of the
notice and shall make further inquiries, inspections, or
examinations that are necessary to properly evaluate the
notice.
(b) The division shall notify the operator of any objections to the notice and shall grant the operator a reasonable opportunity to take action that may be required to
remove the objections or obtain a ruling relative to the
objections from the board.
(4) Approval of a notice of intention for small mining
operations is not required.
(5) The notice of intention for mining operations other than
small mining operations, shall be reviewed as provided in this
subsection.
(a) Within 30 days after receipt of a notice of intention
or within 30 days following the last action of the operator
or the division on the notice of intention, the division shall
make a tentative decision to approve or disapprove the
notice of intention.
(b) The division shall:
(i) mail the information relating to the land affected and the tentative decision to the operator, and
(ii) publish the information and the decision, in
abbreviated form, one time only, in all newspapers of
general circulation published in the county where the
land affected is situated, and in a daily newspaper of
general circulation in Salt Lake City, Utah.
(c) The division shall also mail a copy of the abbreviated information and tentative decision to the zoning
authority of the county in which the land affected is
situated and to the owner of record of the land affected.
(d) (i) Any person or agency aggrieved by the tentative
decision may file a request for agency action with the

(ii) If no requests for agency action are received by
the division within 30 days after the last date of
publication, the tentative decision on the notice of
intention is final and the division shall notify the
operator.
(iii) If written objections of substance are received,
the division shall hold a formal adjudicative proceeding,
(e) Subsection (5) does not apply to exploration.
(6) Within 30 days after receipt of a notice of intention
concerning exploration operations other than small mining
operations, the division will review the notice of intention and
approve or disapprove it.
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40-8-14. Surety requirement — Liability of small mining operations for failure to reclaim — Forfeiture of surety.
(1) After receiving notification that a notice of intention for
mining operations other than small mining operations has
been approved, but prior to commencement of those operations, the operator shall provide surety to the division, in a
form and amount determined by the division or board as
provided in this section.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)r the division
shall approve the amount and form of surety.
(b) In determining the amount of surety to be provided,
the division shall consider:
(i) the magnitude, type, and costs of approved
reclamation activities planned for the land affected;
and
(ii) the nature, extent, and duration of operations
under the approved notice.
(c) The division shall approve a fixed amount estimated
to be required to complete reclamation at any point in
time covered by the notice of intent to an acceptable
standard.
(d) In determining the form of surety to be provided by
the operator, the division shall approve a method acceptable to the operator consistent with the requirements of
this chapter. The form of surety that the operator may
provide includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(i) collateral;
(ii) a bond or other form of insured guarantee;
(iii) deposited securities; or
(iv) cash.
(3) (a) If the operator proposes reclamation surety in the
form of a written contractual agreement, the board shall
approve the form of surety.
(b) In making this decision the board shall consider
(i) the operator's:
(A) financial status;
(B) assets within the state;
(C) past performance in complying with contractual agreements; and
(D) facilities available to carry out the
planned work;
(ii) the magnitude, type, and costs of approved
reclamation activities planned for the land affected;
and
(iii) the nature, extent, and duration of operations
under the approved notice.
(4) In determining the amount and form of surety to be
provided under this section, consideration shall be given to
similar requirements made on the operator by landowners,
governmental agencies, or others, with the intent that surety
requirements shall be coordinated and not duplicated.
• (5) The liability under surety provisions shall continue
until liability in part or in its entirety, is released by the
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<6) If the operator of a small mining operation fails or
erases to carry'out the necessary land reclamation as re- [uired by this chapter and the rules of the board, the board,
ifter notice and hearing, may order that:
(a) reclamation be conducted by the division; and
(b) the costs and expenses of reclamation, together
with costs of collection including attorney's fees, be recovered in a civil action brought by the attorney general
against the Operator in any appropriate rourt.
(7) (a) If the operator of a mining operation other than a
small mining operation fails or refuses to carry out the
necessary land reclamation as outlined in the approved
notice of intention, the board may, after notice and hearing, declare any surety filed for this purpose forfeited.
(b) With respect to the surety filed with the division,
the board shall request the attorney general to take the
necessary legal action to enforce and collect the amount of
liability.
(c) If surety or a bond has been filed with the Division
of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, or any agency of the
federal government, the board shall certify a copy of the
transcript of the hearing and transmit it to the agency
together with a request that the necessary forfeiture
action be taken.
(d) The forfeited surety shall be used only.for the
reclamation of the land to which it relates, and any
residual amount returned to the rightful claimant. 1998
40-8-15. Notice of commencement to division — Operations and progress report.
(1) Within 30 days after commencement of mining operations under an approved notice of intention, the operator shall
give notice of such commencement to the division.
(2) At the end of each calendar year, unless waived by the
division, each operator conducting mining operations under
an approved notice of intention shall file an operations and
progress report with the division on a form prescribed in the
rules promulgated by the board.
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40-8-16. Approved notice of intention valid for life of
operation — Withdrawal, withholding, or refusal of approval — Procedure and basis.
(1) An approved notice of intention or approved revision of
it remains valid for the life of the mining operation, as stated
in it/unless the board withdraws the approval as provided in
Subsection (2).
-* (2) The board or the division ^hall not withdraw approval of
a notice of intention or revision of it, except as follows:
(a) Approval may be withdrawn in the event that the
operator substantially fails to perform reclamation or
conduct mining operations so that the approved reclamation plan can be accomplished.
« (b) Approval may be withdrawn in the event that the
operator fails to provide and maintain surety as may be
required under this chapter.
(c) Approval may be withdrawn in the event that
mining operations are continuously shut down for a
period in excess of five years, unless the extended period
is accepted upon application of the operator.
(3) Approval of a notice of intention may not be refused,
withheld, nor withdrawn by the division until the operator,
who holds or has applied for such approval, has had an
opportunity to request a hearing before the board, present
evidence, cross-examine, and participate fully in the proceedings. Based on the record of the hearing, the board will issue
an order concerning the refusal, withholding, or withdrawal of
the notice of intention. Ifno hearing is requested, the division
mav rofiiop withhold or withdraw aonroval of a notice of

(4) In the event that the division or the board withdraws
approval of a notice of intention or its revision, all mining
operations included under the notice shall be suspended in
accordance with procedures and schedule approved by the
division.
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40-8-17. Responsibility of operator to comply with applicable rules, regulations and ordinances —
Inspections.
(1) The approval of a notice of intention shall not relieve the
operator from responsibility to comply with all other applicable statutes, rules, regulations, and ordinances, including
but not limited to, those applying to safety, air and water
pollution, and public liability and property damage.
(2) As a condition of consideration and approval of a notice
of intention, each applicant or operator under a notice of
intention shall permit members of the board, the division, or
other state agency having lawful interest in the administration of this act, to have the right, at all reasonable times, to
enter the affected land and all related properties included in
the notice of intention, whether or not approved, to make
inspections for the purposes of this act.
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40-8-18. Notice of intention to revise operations —
Procedure.
(1) In recognition that mining operations and related reclamation plans may require revision to fit changing conditions
or developing technology, an operator who is conducting mining operations under an approved notice of intention shall
submit to the division a notice of intention when revising
mining operations. This notice of intention to revise mining
operations shall be submitted in the form provided for in the
rules promulgated by the board.
(2) The notice of intention to revise mining operations will
be designated as an amendment to the existing notice of
intention by the division, based on rules promulgated by the
board. An amendment of a notice of intention will be reviewed
and considered for approval or disapproval by the division
within 30 days of receipt of a notice of intention to revise
mining operations.
(3) A notice of intention to revise mining operations, if not
designated as an amendment of a notice of intention, as set
forth in Subsection (2), shall be processed and considered for
approval by the division in the same manner and within the
same time period as an original notice of intention. The
operator shall be authorized and bound by the requirements of
his existing notice until the revision is acted upon and any
revised surety requirements are established and satisfied.
(4) Small mining operations shall submit an amendment to
the notice of intention when changes in the operations occur.
Approval of an amendment of small mining operations is not
required.
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40-8-19. Transfer of mining operation under approved
notice of intention.
. Whenever an operator succeeds to the interest of another
operator who holds an approved notice of intention or revision
covering a mining operation, by sale, assignment, lease, or
other means, the division may release the first operator from
his responsibilities under his approved notice of intention,
including surety, provided the successor assumes all of the
duties of the former operator, to the satisfaction of the division, under this approved notice of intention, including its
then approved reclamation plan and the posting of surety.
Upon the satisfactory assumption of such responsibilities by
the successor operator, under conditions approved by the
division, the approved notice of intention shall be transferred
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40-8-20. Applicability.
This actshall apply to all lands in the state of Utah, lawfully
subject to its police power. No political subdivision of this state
shall enact laws, regulations, or ordinances which are inconsistent with this act.
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40-8-21. . Temporary suspension or termination of operations — Notice to division — Evaluation
and inspection — Release of surety — Evidence of compliance.
(1) In the case of a temporary suspension of mining operations, excluding labor disputes, expected to be in excess of five
years' duration, the operator shall", within 30 days, notify the
division.
(2) In the case of a termination of mining operations or a
suspension of such operations expected to extend for a period
in excess of two years, the operator shall furnish the division
with such data as it may require in,order to evaluate the
status of the mining operation, performance under the reclamation plan, and the probable future status of the. mineral
deposit and condition of the land affected. '
(3) Upon receipt: of notification of termination or extended
suspension, the division shall, within 30 days, cause an
inspection to be made of the property and take whatever
action may be appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of
this chapter.
(4) The full release by the division of surety posted under
an approved notice of intention shall be prima facie evidence
that the operator has fully complied with the provisions of this
chapter.
law
40-8-22. Division cooperation — Agreements.
(1) The division shall cooperate with other state agencies,
local governmental bodies, agencies of the federal government, and. appropriate private interest in the. furtherance of
the purposes of tins act.
(2) The division is authorized to enter into cooperative
agreements with these agencies, as may be approved by the
board, in furtherance of the purposes of this, act and may
accept or commit funds in connection thereto as may be
appropriated or otherwise provided for the purpose and as
specifically approved by the board, except that such actions
shall not result in any delegation of powers, responsibility, or
authority conferred upon the board or division by this act.,
1975

40-8-23. Effective dates — Exceptions.
This act shall become effective sixty days after adjournment
• of the Legislature except as follows:
(1) Mining operations which are active on the effective
date of this act will be required to prepare and submit a
notice of intention on or before July 1, 1977, and shall he
authorized to continue such existing operations until the
operator obtains approval of his notice of intention. Such
approval shall be obtained by the operator within 36
months from the date of submission of this notice. Subsequent to approval of the notice of intention," the operator
shall be bound by the provisions of the approved notice of
intention and surety requirements as provided in Sections
40-8-13 and 40-8-14.
(2) Mining operations which are active on the effective
date of this act and which are suspended or terminated on
or before July 1,1977, shall advise the division ofthis fact
before July 10/1977, and shall not be required to submit
a notice of intention.
(3) Mining operations which are inactive on the effective date of this act and which resume operations on or
before July 1, 1977, shall be required to prepare and
submit a notice of intention within twelve months follow-
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the resumption of such operations, whichever i s earlier,
and shall be authorized to conduct operations as described
in the .notice of intention until the operator obtains
approval of his notice of intention^ Such approval shall be
obtained by the operator within 36 months from the date
of submission of the notice. Subsequent to approval of the
notice of intention the operator .shall be bound by the
provisio as of the approved notice of intention and. surety
requirements as provided in Sections ,40-8-13 and 40-8-14.
(4) The board and division, in. the initial application of
this act and until July 1,1977* shall npt be bound by the
thirty-day time limitation within which to take action on
a notice of, intention; but all notices of intention filed
before July 1, 1977,. shall be acknowledged as received
within thirty .days of receipt and.action shall be commenced by the division withintwelye.iionths jrom the
date of receipt(5) This act and the rules and regulations promulgated
pnderit shajl be fully effective for all operators and
mining operations active on the effective date ofthis act or
commenced or reactivated on and after Julv 1.1977.
1996
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Pursuant to Notice, on April 22, 1998, at the Department of Natural Resources
Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (the "Board")
convened to deliberate in the above rulemaking matter, which arises under the Utah Mined
Land Reclamation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-1 et seq. (1953, as amended) and the Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a-l et seq. (1953, as amended).
Following the public comment hearing on February 25, 1998 and the close of the written
comment period on March 18, 1998, the Board met solely to deliberate in executive session
on April 22,1998. Since the public comment period for the above matter closed March 18,
1998, no further evidence or oral argument was" heard at the April 22, 1998 deliberation
hearing.

To correct an inadvertent typographical error in the definition of "rock aggregate" as reprinted in that certain
"Order to Adopt Rule" issued in this matter May 5,1998 and served May 7, 1998 (the "Initial Order"), the Board
hereby issues this "Corrected Final Order to Adopt Rule" (the "Corrected Final Order"). Therefore, this Corrected Final
Order supersedes and replaces the Initial Order.
98-001.or2
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The following Board members were present and participated at the
deliberations, creating a quorum: Acting Chairman Elise L. Erler and Board members
Stephanie Cartwright, W. Allan Mashburn, and Raymond Murray. Board member Thomas
B. Faddies recused himself and took no part in the deliberations. Board Chairman Dave D.
Lauriski and Board member Jay L. Christensen were excusedfromthe meeting due to other
conflicting appointments.
Counsel to the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining ("DOGM") in this
rulemaking matter was Assistant Attorney General Daniel G. Moquin. Counsel to the
Associated General Contractors was Joseph C. Rust. Counsel to the Board was Assistant
Attorney General Patrick J. O'Hara.
Having deliberated, the Board's Order is as follows:
The Board has received and carefully reviewed comments from the public
about the proposed rule (i.e., an amendment to Utah Administrative Code R647-1-106) to
define the meaning of "sand," "gravel" and "rock aggregate" for purposes of the Utah
Minerals Program. The Board has considered all supporting and opposing comments, sworn
testimony, and exhibits received into the administrative record in this rulemaking matter, and
this decision is based on that record.
The Board also has carefully considered all written comments filed with the
Board's Secretary up until the close of the comment period on March 18, 1998. In particular,
we have reviewed and considered five sets of comments from representatives of the
following:
9S-001.oi2
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(1) Salt Lake City Corporation (dated 3/15/1998; filed 3/17/1998) (supporting
the proposed rule);
(2) Jack B. Parsons Companies (dated 3/17/1998; filed 3/18/1998) (opposing
the proposed rule);
(3) Kenton P. Barker and Georgia L. Barker (dated 3/2/1998; filed 3/3/1998)
(supporting the proposed rule);
(4) Associated General Contractors (dated 3/10/1998; filed 3/12/1998)
(opposing the proposed rule); and
(5) Cindy Cromer (dated 3/18/1998;filed3/18/1998) (supporting the proposed
rule).
The Board is very grateful for all of the thoughtful and professionally prepared
comments receivedfromthe public, as that input and citizen participation assisted the Board
in deciding this important technical rulemaking matter.
The Board has also reviewed the April 6, 1998 letter memorandum to the
Board from DOGM Acting Director Braxton regarding "Analysis of Comments on the
Proposed Sand Gravel and Rock Aggregate Proposed Rules-Cause No. DAR 20727", which
memorandum was prepared by DOGM at the Board's request (the "Analysis Document").
By unanimous decision, the Board hereby instructs DOGM to publish as a final
rule the above-referenced rule in the identical form as (a) previously published in the Utah
State Bulletin and (b) as previously reviewed by the Board at its public hearing on February
25, 1998. The Board's definitions are as follows:
"Sand" means a naturally occurring unconsolidated to
moderately consolidated accumulation of rock and mineral particles, the
dominant size range being between 1/16 mm to 2 mm, which has been
deposited by sedimentary processes.
98-001.or2
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"Gravel" means a naturally occurring unconsolidated to
moderately consolidated accumulation of rock and mineral particles, the
dominant size range being between 2 mm and 10 mm, which has been
deposited by sedimentary processes.
"Rock Aggregate" means those consolidated rock materials
associated with a sand deposit, a gravel deposit, or a sand and gravel deposit,
that were created by alluvial sedimentary processes. The definition of rock
aggregate specifically excludes any solid rock in the form of bedrock which
is exposed at the surface of the earth or overlain by unconsolidated material.
For the detailed reasons set forth in the Analysis Document, which the Board
hereby adopts and incorporates by reference as its own, and for the additional reasons stated
in this Order, the Board finds that the foregoing definitions are (a) amply supported by
substantial evidence in the record and (b) are entirely consistent with the intended legal
scope of the Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-1 et seq. (1953, as
amended) (the "Act"). For the cogent reasons set forth in the Analysis Document, the Board
does not agree with the two commenters (i.e.. Jack B. Parsons Companies and the Associated
General Contractors) who urge the Board to reject the "rock aggregate" portion of the
proposed rule.
The Board finds that the definitions of "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" set
forth above are rationally based on substantial geological evidence and, as such, are entirely
consistent with the letter and intent of the Legislative exemption in the Act for "sand, gravel
and rock aggregate" operations. Since the Legislature chose to not define the meaning of
"sand, gravel and rock aggregate" in the Act, the Board concludes that the Legislature
expected and intended for the Board to use the Board's and DOGM's special technical and
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administrative expertise over mining and geological matters to adopt, by rule, rational
scientific definitions to implement the "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" exemption. Thus,
to implement the "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" exemption in a rational and reasonable
manner, and with no institutional intent to frustrate that exemption, the Board moves
forward.
The Board does not agree with the opponents' apparent contention that the
definitions set forth above somehow improperly expand the Board's and DOGM's
jurisdiction over previously exempt operators. The Board finds that the purpose and effect
of the proposed rule is entirely consistent with the Legislature's intent. Indeed, the Board
views the new rule as fulfilling the Legislature's desire to exempt bona fide "sand, gravel and
rock aggregate" operations, but not others. The Board has no hidden agenda to expand its or
DOGM's regulatory jurisdictional mandate over non-exempt mining operations in Utah.
Instead, the Board has an affirmative and solemn obligation under the law to apply the Act
to all persons covered by its requirements. The Board and DOGM apply the Act uniformly
and fairly without discrimination, partiality, favoritism or bias for or against any non-exempt
operator. Thus, all non-exempt mine operators within the scope of the Act must comply with
its provisions. The Board has a non-negotiable duty under law fully and fairly to regulate all
non-exempt operators. The Board finds that the new rule will help further this substantial
governmental objective. The Board and DOGM simply do not have the option to exempt
from regulation any non-exempt mine operators covered by the Act.
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The Board's definitions of "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" rationally delimit
the Board's and DOGM's jurisdiction so as to insure, as the Legislature intended, that bona
fide "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" operators are not regulated by the Board or DOGM.
To the extent an operation is a "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" operation (i.e., as those
three key terms are defined in the new rule), that operation will remain, as it always has
been, exemptfromthe Act While it is possible that certain mining operations which are not
exempt, and really never have been exempt, may have been out of compliance with the Act,
the scope of the Board's and DOGM's jurisdiction remains unchanged by the rule. Indeed,
the Board hopes that the helpful definitional clarification provided by the rule substantially
will improve the rate and level of voluntary compliance with the Act by all non-exempt
operators in this State.
DOGM shall coordinate with the Division of Administrative Rules to publish
thefinal"sand, gravel and rock aggregate" definitional rule in exactly the same form as said
rule was previously published in the Utah State Bulletin.
The Secretary shall serve a copy of this Order on all persons who submitted
public comments. Also, if a copy of the Analysis Document has not already been served by
DOGM on said persons, a courtesy copy of the Analysis Document, too, shall be served with
this Order.
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A signed, faxed copy of this Order shall be decuicd equivalent to an cdginal
for all purposes.
ISSUED lhi« y « t o v ofMay, 1998.
UTAHBOARD OF OIL>GAS AM1N1NCJ

By_
HliscL.Erlcr
Tts Acting Chairman
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
CORRECTED FINAL ORDER TO ADOPT RULE in the above-referenced rulemaking
matter this J j _ day of May, 1998 to the following:
see Public Comment Service List (includes interested parties) attached hereto
as Exhibit A.
and that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy of same on said date to:

Mr. Lowell P. Braxton
Acting Director
Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining
1594 West North Temple, Suite 1210
P.O. Box 145801
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5801

Daniel G. Moquin, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Division of Oil, Gas and Mining
Utah Attorney General's Office
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300
P.O. Box 140855
1 Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0855
Ms. Mary Ann Wright
Associate Director of Mining
Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining
1594 West North Temple, Suite 1210
P.O. Box 145801
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5801

Mr. Ron Daniels
Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining
1594 West North Temple, Suite 1210
P.O. Box 145801
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5801

Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Board of Oil, Gas and Mining
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
[ Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857

Christine Allred, Board Secretary
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EXHIBIT A
PUBLIC

John Adkins, Jr.
P.O. Box 386
Coalville, Utah 84017
Kenton P. Barker
Georgia L. Barker
2850 North 1000 West
Ogden,Utah 84414
Thomas E Bingham, President
Utah Mining Association
136 South Main, Suite 709
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Cindy Cromer
816 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Jack B. Parson Companies
Attn: Paul Glauser
2350 South 1900 West
Ogden,Utah 84401
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SERVICE LIST

Joseph C. Rust, Esq
Attorney for the
Associated General Contractors
KESLER & RUST
36 South State Street, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Rick Thorne, Executive Manager
Utah Chapter
Associated General Contractors
1135 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Salt Lake City Corporation
Attn: Craig A. Hinckley
451 South State Street, Room 406
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
"•a/ District
*> #
MEMORANDUM DEClfilON
ZljQ

ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS,
UTAH CHAPTER,

By^^^KE

COUNTY

CASE NO. 9809089

Plaintiff,

0e

^yc£r

vs«
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AMD MINING,
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,:
STATE OF UTAH,
:

Defendant.
:

The parties1 Motions for Summary Judgment were argued February
2, 2000, and the matter was taken under advisement.
This action concerns a rule issued by the Board of Oil, Gas &
Mining which defines the terms

fl

sand,M

"gravel,w

and

"rock

aggregate," as utilized in the Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act,
Plaintiff claims that the defendant exceeded its rulemaking powers
by issuing a rule that is contrary to the purpose of the Utah Mined
Land Reclamation Act.
Plaintiff challenges the defendants rule under the Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Section 63-46a-12.1(4) of that Act
allows this Court to grant the plaintiff relief if it finds that:
(a) the Board does not have the legal authority to make the rule;
or (b) the rule is not supported by substantial evidence.
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Also at issue is the relevant standard of review.

"Standard

of review" governs the amount of deference this Court should give
to the Board's rulemaking procedure.
The Board moves for Summary Judgment on the grounds that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and accordingly it is entitled
to Judgment as a matter of law.

The contractors move for Summary

Judgment on similar grounds.
The parties agree that there are no issues of material fact
which would preclude the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment
as a matter of law.
Plaintiff argues that the Board did not have the legal
authority to make the rule since the statute addresses the
reclamation of mining lands and sand, gravel and rock aggregate
extractions do not constitute mining operations.
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, it seems plausible that the
Board

would

promulgate

a rule to

define the terms

"sand,"

"gravel"and "rock aggregate." Clarifying the terms simply insures
that surety exemptions apply only to the proper entities.

The

plaintiff's second argument is that the rule is not supported by
substantial

evidence.

They

argue

that

the

Board

has

not

substantiated its claim that the rule was supported by substantial

ASSOC. GEN. V. BD. OF
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This argument is weak and the contractors fail to cite

any specific facts to support their contention.
Plaintiff argues that the proper standard of review should be
correction of error/no deference, citing the case of SEMECO
Industries v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167
(Utah 1993).

This case is distinguishable because Justice Durham

in addressing the need for post-UAPA standards of review, speaks to
cases in which the standard is at issue under UAPA and not UARA.
While UAPA and UARA have similar provisions, there are significant
differences between the two.

Notably, judicial review under the

UAPA speaks specifically to the appellate courts, while UARA refers
to the district court.
The Board moves for Summary Judgment on the basis that it had
the authority to make the rule under Section 40-8-6(1) and 40-8-3.
Both parties agree that the Mining Act is not applicable to sand,
gravel and rock aggregate.

The Board argues the rule provides

definition to help clarify crucial undefined terms to insure that
bona fide sand, gravel and rock aggregate operators are not
regulated. The plaintiff obviously is concerned that sand, gravel
and rock aggregate operators will be regulated who would not be in
the absence of the rule.

The Board argues that the rule is

reasonable and based on substantial evidence. Substantial evidence
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is defined as "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion."
First Nat1! Bank v. County Bd of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165
(Utah 1990).

A review of the statutes and the cases persuade the

Court that the Board1s definition does not improperly expand the
Board's jurisdiction, that the Board1s definition corresponds with
the overall purpose of the Mining Act, and that the Board's
definition is consistent with Larson Limestone v. Division of Oil,
Gas & Mining, 903 P.2d 429 (Utah 1995).

The Court also adopts the

standard of review for which the Board argues, that is, the
tolerable limits of reason/intermediate deference as explained in
Williams v. Public Serv. Coming of Utah. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1987).
To reach that conclusion, the Board's definition of sand, gravel
and rock aggregate has to be within the tolerable limits of reason.
Williams sets the following parameters: (1) when reviewing general
questions of law it is a correction of error standard; (2) when
reviewing questions of fact, the court affords great deference; (3)
when reviewing mixed matters of fact and law or when interpreting
operative provisions of the statutory law, the rational standard in
which the court should set aside only if*the rule is arbitrarily
imposed beyond the limits of reason.

This question falls into

category (3). If (3) is the correct standard, the rule should only
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be set aside if it is arbitrary and capricious.

Plaintiff has

failed to persuade the Court that there is anything arbitrary or
capricious about the rule.

Under the Mined Land Reclamation Act

the Board is empowered to "enact rules according to the procedures
and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46a, that are reasonably
necessary to carry out the purpose of the Chapter 40-8-6(1) . •• The
Board's rule defining sand, gravel and rock aggregate is within the
purview of the Boardfs power and appears to further the purpose of
the Act. The Board agrees with the plaintiff that sand, gravel and
rock aggregate are exempt.

The rule rationally assists in

determining those entities that are exempt from the Act.
The administrative record consists of testimony from the
briefing of Oil, Gas & Mining staff, as well as company materials.
Viewed as a whole, the administrative record appears to support the
rule by substantial evidence.

Proper rulemaking procedures were

followed. The rule corresponds with the purpose of the Mining Act,
and the rule does not improperly expand the Board's jurisdiction.
As indicated above, the Court finds the intermediate standard of
review is appropriate, however, even if the appropriate standard of
review had been the correction of err or/no "deference argued for by
the plaintiff, the result would have been the same. The Board did
not err in adopting the rule, and the Board's findings supporting

ASSOC. GEN. V. BD. OF
OIL GAS & MINING

PAGE 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

the rule are rationally based. Summary Judgment is awarded to the
defendant. Defendant is to prepare a Judgment consistent with this
opinion.
Dated this

.day of March, 2000.

C2L
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following,
this /( day of March, 2000:

Joseph C. Rust
Jason H. Robinson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
36 S. State Street, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas A. Mitchell
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS,
UTAH CHAPTER,

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 980908915

vs.
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING,
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion for
a

Protective

Order

Concerning

Plaintiff's

First

Set

of

Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents.
Also pending is plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply
Memorandum.
In

seeking

a

Protective

Order,

defendant

argues

that

plaintiff's discovery requests are not even calculated to lead to
discovery of admissible evidence, as required under Rule 26(b) (1),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In this lawsuit, plaintiff is

challenging a rule promulgated by defendant, arguing that the rule
is

not

in accord with the

language of the Utah Mine Land

Reclamation Act, Under the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act,
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Utah Code Ann., Section 63-46a-l (Supp. 1998) (U.A.R.A.), a person
who is aggrieved by an administrative rule promulgated may file an
action with the district court to seek judicial review of that
rule.
Defendant argues that a party challenging an administrative
rulemaking may not supplement the administrative record in the
district court, that the district court acts in an appellate
capacity in reviewing administrative action and that its review to
a challenged rule is limited to deciding

(1) if the rule is

consistent with applicable substantive law and/or (2) if it is
supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. In
arguing that the rulemaking record is already complete, with
defendant acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, defendant asserts
that this Court may not embark upon a de novo review.
Plaintiff argues that the U.A.R.A. is devoid of language
showing that the district court should act in an appellate capacity
in reviewing administrative rulemaking decisions. Plaintiff argues
that the district court should act as a ^trial court" and review
the decision of the administrative agency in the capacity of a
trial court.
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This Court is persuaded by defendant's argument that the role
of the district court is limited to determining whether the
administrative agency has made a rational decision in compliance
with

the

law

and

the

substantial

evidence

on

the

record.

Accordingly, this Court's review should be limited to the record of
the administrative agency, which record has been filed with the
Court by defendant.

This ruling is based upon a review of the

plain language of the U.A.R.A. and by defendant's arguments with
regard to the law and policy.

See, e.g., Rybachek v. Environmental

Protection Agrencv, 904 F.2d 1276, 1296 fn. 25 (9th Cir. 1990).
This Court further finds that defendant's Reply Memorandum is
appropriate in scope.
Therefore, defendant's Motion

for a Protective Order is

granted, and defendant's Motion to Strike Defendant's Memorandum is •
denied.
Defendant is to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling.
Dated this

n

day of March, 1999.^—;-.V:
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MMLIUg CERTIFICATE.

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, this
day of March, 1999:

Joseph C. Rust
Jason C. Robinson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
36 S. State Street, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Patrick J. O'Hata
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857

